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No 155/2017, which in February 2019 has been 
converted into the new Insolvency and Crisis Code 
(IC-Code), has introduced a compulsory Early 
Warning System to detect occurring crisis. In its life 
cycle, a company may experience periods of crisis. 
Detecting any signals in time is very important: the 
company‟s survival may depend on it. If the crisis is 
monitored promptly and appropriate measures are 
the enterprise continue tomaytaken, not only
seizetoablebealsomayitbutoperate
opportunities for growth. The concept of crisis, for 
Many ofwith.dealtocomplexentrepreneurs, is
thisof rejection ofattitudeanthem show
eventuality and have a substantial difficulty in 
admitting the decline, at least until it assumes such 
importance that the crisis can no longer be hidden. 
In fact, crises are generally preceded by stages of 
if promptlywhich,the situationworsening of
diagn thestoppingallowwith,dealtandosed
turnaround.atriggerandprocessdegenerative
Crises often occur not because they are inevitable, 
but because companies cannot catch the warning 
signs, so they are not able to monitor the threats to 
prevent them and consequently to limit the damage. 
This phenomena is more evident in Family SMEs 
which are usually family firms directed by a sole 
entrepreneur or a family board used to concentrate 
all responsibilities in her hands and in which 
governance structure is not considered a relevant 
issue (Colarossi, Giorgino, Steri, & Viviani, 2008). The 
IC-Code sets up new corporate governance rules for 
all those entities pretending the introduction of 
independent control bodies. The Early Warning 
System is intended as an instrument aimed at 
driving the companies in the identification of the 
very first signs of crisis. Monitoring the occurring of 
the crisis is no longer a responsibility of the sole 
entrepreneur or of the board of directors, but other 
legitimized subjects are identified. These are, on the 
one side, the corporate control bodies which in Italy 
are the Board of Statutory Auditors (Collegio 
Sindacale) and/or the External Auditors and on the 
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The Early Warning System is intended as an instrument aimed at 
driving the companies in the identification of the very first signs 
of crisis. Monitoring the occurring of the crisis is no longer a 
responsibility of the sole entrepreneur or of the board of 
directors but other legitimized subjects are identified. The IC-
Code sets up new corporate governance rules for a huge number 
of Italian Family SMEs pretending the introduction of 
independent control bodies, Board of Statutory Auditors, and/or 
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(Agenzia delle Entrate), the national insurance 
institution and the tax collection agent. Among these 
subjects it is undoubtedly the Board of Statutory 
Auditors to play the role of the main recipient of the 
signs of crisis as a body assigned to monitor and 
supervision to enforce compliance of management 
with statutes and by-laws. This is confirmed by the 
significant extension of the number of companies – 
particularly Family SMEs - that will be obliged to 
change their habits converting their simple 
entrepreneurial governance by providing for at least 
some kind of control bodies to cope with the new 
Code. Size of the company becomes then crucial: in 
the near future there will be a change in Italy that is 
expected to involve the governance a big number of 
companies. The appointment of the corporate 
supervisory body - Board of Statutory Auditors 
and/or External Auditor - becomes mandatory if the 
company has exceeded for at least two consecutive 
years one of the following: 
 total assets in the financial statements: 2 
million Euro; 
 the revenues from sales and services: 2 million 
Euro; 
 employees employed on average during the 
financial year: 10 employees. 
The IC-Code aims at changing Family SMEs 
Corporate Governance: special Italian approach to 
the matter is chosen introducing independent 
professionals with a watchdog role. On one side this 
means that no direct impact is registered on the 
board structure. Independent professionals do not 
take part to the decision making process nor as 
executive, nor as non-executive directors. On the 
other side the novelty – for Family SMEs - is that 
they mandatory “seat in the room” as they are asked 
to participate to the board meetings. Their duty is to 
monitor compliance and going concern matters, 
having the power - when needed - first, to start the 
alert procedure, then, when it seems that no ways 
out are available, even to file for bankruptcy. The 
paper also considers some of the parliamentary 
hearings records to point out strengths and 
weaknesses of the legislator choices which may 
influence the enforcement and finally the success of 
the transition towards the SMEs new governance 
model. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The IC-Code Target SME‟s are 175.000 (Negri, 2017). 
In Italy SME‟s are almost all Family Firms (Gnan & 
Montemerlo, 2008). This means that they are firms 
in which the majority of the capital is held by one, or 
few, families connected from ties of relative, affinity 
or solid alliances. They represent the dominant 
business model all over the world (Colarossi, 
Giorgino, Steri, & Viviani, 2008). Family firms are 
known on one side for a number of strength points 
such as the involvement of the founder„s 
entrepreneurial talent (Anderson & Reeb, 2003), the 
long-term strategic horizon (Stein, 1988; Stein, 1989, 
James, 1999), the access to cheaper debt (Anderson, 
Sattar, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003), the continuous 
preferential relationships both with suppliers and 
financial supporters (Anderson et al., 2003), the 
reduced agency costs due to the trust among family 
members (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Ang, Cole, & Lin, 
2000), the reputation and strength in the industry 
going on for many generations which improve 
shareholders confidence and reduce potential 
agency conflicts (Wan Mohammad, Wan Yusoff, & 
Salleh, 2014). Besides on the other side several 
scholars attribute to Family Firms several self-
defeating behaviours‟ such as nepotism and 
favouritism towards the family members (Kets de 
Vries, 1996; Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel, & Gutiérrez, 
2001) and suboptimal financing by outside equity, 
due to family‟s aversion to external shareholders. 
Some underline that most families do not pay 
enough attention to the governance of their 
businesses, and that good family firm governance 
should be the result of good family governance too 
(Lansberg, 1999). Inside family businesses, conflicts 
can easily arise. Such conflicts may be of several 
types: justice conflicts, role conflicts, work-family 
conflicts, identity conflicts, succession conflicts, 
arguments about power and control, role 
ambiguities, rivalries between brothers and sisters, 
conflicts between family members and employees 
caused by nepotism (Cosier & Harvey, 1998). 
Moreover, business decisions sometimes badly affect 
the family equilibrium (Harvey & Evans, 1994) by 
creating long-term family feuds (LaChapelle & 
Barnes, 1998). Thus, the creation of effective 
corporate governance structures could improve not 
only the relationships between family ownership and 
agents, but also the rules and hierarchies established 
inside the family (Whisler, 1988). Independent 
professionals are taken in great consideration 
because they usually provide firm specific 
knowledge and strong commitment towards the 
company (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Similar 
suggestions come from the agency theory: in order 
to build a corporate governance system the board 
should be mainly composed of non-executive 
directors, not to undermine its objectivity 
(Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). Studies that 
have shown that in family firms, the classic owner-
manager conflict does not occur. However, this 
result may be explained by the role of the board in 
family firms as an agency cost control mechanism 
that acts as a substitute for other systems. In family 
firms, agency conflicts may occur, but with 
distinctive features that enable governance systems 
to overcome them (Songini & Gnan, 2015). It is 
relevant for our work to highlight that corporate 
governance variations over time may help a family 
firm to move through its organizational life cycle, by 
creating an appropriate fit with the evolving 
strategic needs. Appropriate governance practices 
may contribute to strategic renewal and value 
creation in family business especially when moving 
from state of crisis to a renewed growth and 
profitability stage. Creating an effective system of 
corporate governance is a crucial task, requiring an 
appropriate balance between accountability and 
entrepreneurial dimensions to carry out the firms 
strategies (Di Toma, 2012). Finally Scholars assert 
that corporate governance is influenced by 
institutional factors and that the legal environment 
defines property rights and sets boundaries within 
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3. THE NEW ITALIAN EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
PROVIDED BY THE IC-CODE 
 
Based on the indications of the Proposal for a 
European Directive (COM (2016) 723) – on the theme 
of preventive restructuring and insolvency – Italy 
has adopted the Directive by introducing the “Crisis 
and Insolvency Code” (IC-Code). In the following 
sections it is sought to provide a systemic reading 
that takes account of the indications of the new 
Italian “Crisis and Insolvency Code” published as a 
draft in December 2017 and definitively approved 
with amendments in February 2019. The declared 
objective of the new legislative set-up is to reach 
better creditors satisfaction by safeguarding the 
debtor‟s rights as well as to favour overcoming the 
crisis by ensuring a going concern. It is worthwhile 
emphasising that the new “Crisis and Insolvency 
Code” provides significant legal definition of the two 
"crisis" and "insolvency" concepts. Specifically, 
“crisis” must mean a situation of economic and 
financial difficulty that makes insolvency of the 
debtor probable and, for the companies, manifests 
itself as an inadequacy of the future cash flows so as 
to be able to regularly comply with the previous 
obligations. Contrarily, a debtor is defined as 
“insolvent” when it is unable to regularly comply 
with its obligations. Insolvency laws have developed 
more or less reliable and exact indicators for the 
beginning of the common pool problem such as „acts 
of bankruptcy‟ (flight of the debtor, non-payment of 
an adjudicated claim, etc.) or general definitions 
(over-indebtedness, illiquidity, etc.). In more recent 
years, the reach of insolvency (and hybrid) 
proceedings has, in many countries, widened and 
their boundaries have blurred. Insolvency 
proceedings can be triggered even during earlier, 
often less clearly defined stages of the debtor‟s 
crisis (e.g. imminent insolvency, likelihood of 
insolvency, unsurmountable difficulties and similar).  
In some important instances, proceedings that are 
considered to address insolvency may even be 
started by the debtor without having to prove or 
even just assert their insolvency or crisis 
(Stanghellini, Mokal, Paulus, & Tirado, 2018). 
 
3.1.  The role of the corporate supervisory bodies 
 
Mainly corporate crises are not sudden events. They 
develop an incubation phase that can be considered 
as physiological as it involves any company 
structurally. It manifests itself with the recognition 
of management or production inefficiencies. Its 
seriousness and evolution must be evaluated by the 
directors, including with the aid of forecasting 
instruments such as budget and business plan, to 
evaluate the evolution of the operations and 
intervene with specific corrections. The Board of 
Statutory Auditors check the conduct of the 
administrative bodies ensuring that an adequate 
administrative and organisational system is 
implemented with particular reference to the 
presence, structure and functioning, on the one side 
not only of an adequate accounting framework but 
also of an internal control system that monitors the 
robustness of the accounting data, and, on the other 
side, of an adequate management system which is 
able to construct reliable and effective indicators to 
monitor, amongst other things, the parameters 
identified in the new “Crisis and Insolvency Code”. 
The new Italian legislative set up provides that when 
“well-founded evidence” of the crisis is recognised 
the corporate supervisory bodies must “immediately 
inform” the Board of Directors for appropriate 
provisions to be taken.  
If the situation described is not resolved and 
therefore persists, the company can slide into a 
second phase of the so-called maturation of the 
crisis. Inefficiencies that are not promptly resolved 
in the incubation phase produce larger effects that 
commence undermining the corporate resources. For 
the purpose of having a timelier alert and, in 
consideration, especially in the Italian context, of the 
significance of the banks as the main company 
financiers or, in case of smaller business entities, the 
only company financiers, the new legislative set up 
has introduced some direct disclosure obligations 
between these parties and the corporate control 
bodies. More specifically the banks, at the time when 
they communicate changes or revisions of credit 
lines to the customer, must also notify the corporate 
control bodies, if existing. The corporate control 
bodies, specifically, as will be better seen below, the 
Board of Statutory Auditors, which constantly 
monitor a series of company performance 
indicators, are called upon in this phase to evaluate 
whether to put an “internal alert” system into place. 
It must be ensured that the directors are aware of 
the existence of a more identified and significant 
criticality as compared to the previous phase and of 
the need to enter into a well identified path to avoid 
consolidation of a crisis situation. For this purpose 
the Board of Statutory Auditors and external 
Auditors can decide on some further moves, this 
time more formal. Once the situation is classified as 
significant and, naturally, in the event of inertia of 
the directors or rather only in the case where they 
have not put in place adequate provisions even 
following less invasive interactions with these 
control bodies, they can indeed decide to implement 
a specific “notification procedure”. For this purpose 
the Board of Statutory Auditors and the external 
Auditors must send a specific official written 
notification to the directors, motivating their 
decision, presumably by means of certified e-mail or 
registered letter with acknowledgement of receipt 
with which a suitable, but short term, must be fixed, 
which the law identifies as not more than thirty days 
within which the Board of Directors must refer 
regarding the solutions identified and the actions 
undertaken.  
If the intervention described is not timely or 
does not produce a positive result, the company can 
however enter into a proclaimed crisis phase. The 
latter is characterised by the occurrence of more 
significant financial imbalances that, once again, if 
not actively managed, can seriously undermine the 
going concern. A “crisis” is arrived in a legal sense or 
rather, as anticipated, as the “inadequacy of the 
prospective cash flows to regularly meet planned 
obligations”. The corporate supervisory bodies check 
the correct approach to an interlocution process 
with strategically significant parties for company 
survival. They must also evaluate whether the 
company can still autonomously exit from the crisis 
under only the guidance of the directors or else if, 
for the purpose of making the company‟s business 
secure, it is necessary to commence a process of 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 16, Issue 3, Spring 2019 
 
67 
“internal alert to the outside”. In this connection the 
new legislative set-up provides that, in the case 
where the programmed interventions, including 
possibly following an “internal alert”, first informal 
and then formal, as mentioned in previous phases, 
these are considered as inadequate or in the case of 
inertia, meaning failure to adopt sufficient 
measures, the corporate supervisory board must 
inform the specific third party entity called the OCRI 
(Organismo di Composizione della Crisi di Impresa) 
or “Company Crisis Composition Committee” of the 
situation recognised. It is necessary to show that: 
 on the one side, the timely notification to the 
company crisis composition organism constitutes a 
case of exoneration from joint and several liability 
for the corporate supervisory bodies for prejudicial 
consequences of the omissions or actions 
subsequently conducted by the Board of Directors, 
differing from the directives received, which are not 
direct consequences of decisions adopted before 
notification; 
 on the other side and in the same way, reward 
measures and measures holding the entrepreneur 
harmless against any punishable liabilities, if the 
same provides a timely remedy for the crisis 
situation occurred. 
 
3.2. The role of the qualified public creditors 
 
Furthermore, the new code identifies a specific 
category of parties considered as particularly 
significant for the purpose of the timely emersion 
from the crisis that are defined as “qualified public 
creditors” and to which very significant powers are 
attributed in relation to the alert process. This refers 
to the Revenue Agency, national institute for social 
security and agent for tax collection. The power to 
start a further notification to the “Company Crisis 
Composition Committee” is attributed thereto. This 
refers to a “totally external alert” or, rather an 
“external alert to the outside” as it is promoted by a 
third party with “contrasting interests” to the 
company reality and directed to another external 
party. The procedure provided for is made totally 
objective as it operates in accordance with specific 
automatism in relation to the overcoming of debts 
watch-list thresholds, it is necessary to understand 
that accordingly it could have already been activated 
even in prior phases. This refers to a method of 
inserting a totally autonomous and simultaneous 
alert compared to that entrusted to the corporate 
supervisory bodies. Indeed no coordination between 
the two processes seems to be envisaged, nor is it 
explicitly required that there is a direct and 
preliminary exchange of information between the 
two parties. 
 
3.3. Intervention of the OCRI, (Company Crisis 
Composition Committee) 
 
The effects of the activation of the OCRI are 
immediate. The Committee is in fact expected to 
appoint a board of three independent professionals 
(hereinafter also Triade), required to comply, among 
other things, with the obligation of confidentiality 
regarding all information acquired in the exercise of 
its functions and to the secrecy regarding facts and 
documents of which they become aware by reason of 
the office. The Triade promptly convenes the 
directors to identify together the possible measures 
to be undertaken to remedy the crisis and fix a 
period within which the directors must report in 
order to implement them. If the company proves to 
have identified a specific path and to have 
undertaken useful steps to follow it through, a time 
frame is set of not greater than three months, 
extendable to a maximum of six months in case of 
positive results of the negotiations, for the search 
for an agreed solution to the crisis. In most cases the 
path proposed by the company must be extra-
judicial in nature and executed with written 
agreement with the creditors that are deposited with 
the Committee and are not conspicuous to different 
subjects than those who subscribed to them. These 
agreements assume a relevant legal value in that 
they are not liable to revocation action as they would 
have been in the case of implementation of a 
certified plan. The new Code does not exclude direct 
recourse to crisis regulation procedures without a 
preventive attempt at extrajudicial agreement. 
In case of failure of the extra-judicial 
negotiations, assisted or not by the Triade appointed 
by the OCRI, the phase that legal theory 
characterises as reversible insolvency is entered into. 
The new code, as already mentioned, characterises 
“insolvency” as the state of the debtor no longer in a 
position to regularly satisfy their own obligations. In 
this phase this situation is noted and manifests both 
in a company context and externally against third 
parties for the failures and for the failed attempts to 
meet free individual or collective agreements with 
creditors. In the event that the external alert has 
already been activated in the previous phase and, at 
the expiry of the assigned or extended deadline, it 
has not been possible to reach an extra-judicial 
agreement with the creditors involved, the Triade 
invites the debtor to apply for access to a crisis 
regulation or insolvency procedure within a very 
short time frame (maximum of 30 days). To 
counteract the difficulties of the crisis, the legislator 
has introduced in the last decade some specific 
instruments: a) the attested plan (ex. Article 67 of 
the Bankruptcy Act, become Article 60 of the IC-
Code); b) the restructuring agreement (ex. Article 
182 bis of the Bankruptcy Act, become Article 61 of 
the IC-Code); c) the preventive agreement (ex. Article 
160 of the Bankruptcy Act, become Article 89 of the 
IC-Code). 
If the directors do not see the possibility of 
taking recourse to one of the crisis and insolvency 
regulation procedures or the latter have not led to 
the hoped for outcome, the company is considered 
to be in the final phase of the process referred to as 
confirmed insolvency. The situation is now 
irreversible, remedial objectives are no longer 
usefully achievable, nor are there sufficient fresh 
financial means available to implement an agreed 
settlement. 
 
4. THE WIDENING OF THE RANGE OF CORPORATE 
BODIES SUBJECT TO LEGAL FORMS OF CONTROL AS 
A CONDITION FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE ALERT 
PROCESS 
 
According to recent researches, Limited Liability 
Companies with mandatory Board of Auditors were 
less than 3% of the total in 2013 and the great 
majority of them entrusted the accounting auditing 
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to the same Board of Auditors, continuing the 
deeply rooted Italian tradition (Bellavite Pellegrini, 
2013). So the scope of the IC-Code asks for a big 
change as it asks the enhancement of company 
supervisory function broadening the range of 
corporate bodies subject to legal forms of control. 
The appointment of the corporate control body 
(Board of Statutory Auditors or sole statutory 
auditor), or of the auditor becomes mandatory for 
all companies if the size is relevant no matter the 
form of society. This happens if the company has 
exceeded, for two consecutive years at least one of 
the following three limits: 
 total assets on balance sheet: 2 million euro 
(equal to less than 50% of the previous limit of 4.4 
million euro);  
 revenues from sales and performance: 2 
million euro (equal to less than 25% of the previous 
limit of 8.8 million euro); 
 employees employed on average during the 
year: 10 units (equal to 20% of the previous limit of 
50 units). The obligation to appoint ceases when, for 
three consecutive years, the aforementioned limits 
are not exceeded. 
This cultural transition shall probably be much 
greater and more invasive than the introduction of 
the OCRI as well as the identification of automatic 
crisis detection mechanisms imposed on qualified 
public creditors. The introduction of these new 
thresholds represents a clear recognition of the 
usefulness of the control functions carried out 
according to the deontological and professional 
standards of reference for the correct functioning of 
the corporate system. It is a choice that is designed 
to change the behaviour of directors of medium 
businesses, but above all of small and micro 
businesses that, as noted, are very numerous in the 
Italian environment and that to date have escaped 
the obligation to equip themselves with adequate 
internal control systems, if not even with adequate 
accounting and management systems. 
 
5. SUPERVISORY ACTIVITIES AND THEREFORE THE 
"EX ANTE" CONTROL CARRIED OUT BY THE BOARD 
OF STATUTORY AUDITORS 
 
With the issuing of the "Commercial code" in 1882, a 
supervisory body was introduced in Italy in order to 
verify compliance with the law, the Constitution and 
by-laws so as to entrust the company's fate not 
entirely to the directors, placing their activities 
under the control of independent professional 
parties so as to protect the interests of the company, 
its shareholders and of all stakeholders. In fact, the 
protection of all interests must be emphasised 
among the functions of the Board of Statutory 
Auditors. It is a unique model on the international 
scene as it envisages a specific body composed 
exclusively of professionals, completely independent 
from the board of directors, which are in charge of 
the ex ante control of the latter's activity. The Board 
of Statutory Auditors is typical of the so-called 
"traditional" management system that represents the 
prevailing model in the Italian context. The structure 
of the traditional model provides for:  
 the administrative body appointed by the 
shareholders' meeting that is responsible for 
managing the company;  
 the Board of Statutory Auditors also 
appointed by the shareholders' meeting which 
supervises the work of directors;  
 the auditor, always appointed by the 
shareholders' meeting, who is responsible for the 
control of the accounting management. In small 
companies the Board of Statutory Auditors can 
easily fill both roles. Alternatively to this model, 
Italian companies can access the so-called "one-tier 
system", a system consistent with the Anglo-Saxon 
governance models, and the "two-tier system", 
consistent with the German model, which are also 
widespread internationally. 
It is important to underline that the traditional 
model allows for a precise division of roles: the 
administrative function is clearly separated from the 
supervisory and control functions. The Board of 
Statutory Auditors is composed of three or five 
standing members plus two alternate members and 
at least one of the statutory auditors and one of the 
alternate members must be a registered auditor. 
From the introduction of corporate reform (Italian 
Decree-Law 6/2003) the Board of Statutory Auditors 
is responsible for supervising this term by entering 
into:  
 compliance of the law and the by-laws;  
 verification of compliance of directors' 
decisions with principles of rationality, assessing 
whether the necessary information has been taken 
into account;  
 the adequacy of the organisational structure 
in relation to the size, the nature of operations and 
strategies planned for achieving the company goals. 
To fully exercise their duties, the members of 
the Board of Statutory Auditors participate in the 
board of directors directly assisting the decision-
making processes and, if necessary, intervening by 
exercising their control powers when decisions are 
about to be taken (ex-ante control). This also 
assumes a decisive importance, inter alia, for 
purposes of alert, as will be shown below, as any 
external control body, and above all, the auditor can 
only intervene when strategies have already been 
deliberated on and implemented to record the 
effects of these on the company balance (ex-post 
control). The peculiarity of the Italian control system 
is the coexistence of two levels of control. A 
downstream control performed by the auditors 
responsible for the accounting management and an 
upstream check by the Board of Statutory Auditors 
on the behaviour of directors. The Rules of Conduct 
of the Italian National Council of Chartered 
Accountants and Accounting Experts for the Board 
of Statutory Auditors, establish that the latter in the 
performance of the function recognised by the law, 
ensures that the control system on the one side and 
the organisational and administrative arrangements 
on the other - and therefore the accounting and 
management systems - adopted by the company are 
adequate to promptly detect signals that raise 
significant doubts about the company's ability to 
continue operating as an operating entity. The 
document states that the Board of Statutory 
Auditors can request clarifications from the 
administrative body and request the latter to take 
appropriate measures. 
It is only necessary to remember that the 
board's supervisory role has been attentive and 
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praised also by foreign observers. Joseph Stigliz2 - 
Nobel Prize winner for economy in 2001 - 
highlighted the critical issues and risks of the 
governance systems based only on external controls, 
or in other words with only external Auditors ex post 
controls, in the absence of a careful ex ante 
supervision activity - typically the Anglo-Saxon 
models - praising the Italian model based on a 
structure that presents an independent and internal 
control body, namely the Board of Statutory 
Auditors whose role has been emphasised by the 
new code. 
 
6. SYSTEMIC INCONSISTENCY OF THE NEW 
PROVISIONS IF ONLY THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR IS 
APPOINTED. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM 
 
An important consideration must put forward. We 
have already said that the legislator has intervened 
heavily on Art. 2477 of the Italian Civil Code which 
provides for the cases in which it is compulsory to 
appoint a control bodies, considerably increasing the 
number of companies involved. However, it is 
envisaged that it is possible to alternatively appoint 
the Board of Statutory Auditors or an External 
Auditor. 
The final text presents important systemic 
inconsistencies that risk jeopardising the 
effectiveness of the use of indicators for crisis 
prevention allowing companies to choose which type 
of control to undergo. All companies, in fact, can 
decide whether or not to have a corporate control 
body - which is the Board of Statutory Auditors - or 
to limit themselves to appointing only the External 
Auditor who, as already highlighted in the previous 
paragraph, has no supervisory powers.  
It has already been considered that the crisis is 
defined by the new point or section of the law as the 
inadequacy of future cash flows to regularly meet 
planned obligations. The Crisis and Insolvency Code 
therefore requires that a corporate control body 
focus its attention on the company's future 
prospects and to this purpose it is necessary for it to 
exercise supervisory powers over the actions of its 
directors. The analysis of results obtained in the 
past cannot be considered sufficient to assess 
whether the company is entering a crisis period or 
not, at least not in the sense introduced by the act. 
In fact, the External Auditor performs an ex post 
control and its audits inspect the annual financial 
statements. On the basis of these activities, the 
External Auditor will certainly be able to provide for 
the alert, but his intervention can only be 
structurally late and therefore inconsistent with the 
time-scales established by law for carrying out 
checks for purposes of alert and consequently with 
the need for timeliness expressed by the Code.  
The legislator's choice on whether or not to 
appoint the Board of Statutory Auditors mandatory 
in any case, structurally weakens the crisis 
prevention mechanism and is a consequence of the 
erroneous conviction of the existence of an 
interchangeability and overlap between the two 
figures. On the contrary, within corporate 
governance studies and practice it is well known 
that the two roles are very different. It is only 
                                                          
2Stiglitz J. "The Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system has failed. Now 
look at the Italian model". CNDCEC, Press Release, 2009. 
necessary to recall that the External Auditor's 
functions are limited to expressing a professional 
opinion on the correctness of the statements, and 
are codified by the auditing standards published in 
the European Union's official journal. They are in no 
way comparable to the supervisory functions 
assigned by the Italian Civil Code to the corporate 
control bodies (see Articles 2400 et seq. for 
statutory auditors). In particular, the External 
Auditor: does not participate in the boards of 
directors and does not oversee either management 
or the appropriate arrangements. Furthermore, it is 
only necessary to remember that it cannot express 
opinions on interim accounting situations (see doc. 
Assirevi 173). It would therefore be desirable, as 
suggested in more than one parliamentary hearing, 
to provide for the appointment of either the Board 
of Statutory Auditors or External Auditor. In 
particular, it is worth mentioning that many 
Institutions expressed to be in favour of the change 
during the work in the Senate Judiciary Committee. 
Among others we mention the Working Group 
Rordorf 2 of the Italian National Council of 
Chartered Accountants and Accounting Experts 
(CNDCEC), or the Association of Professionals for 
Corporate Restructuring (APRI) and some academics 
including representatives of the University of 
Eastern Piedmont and the University of Bergamo 
with its Insolvency Observatory. As is clear from the 
records of the hearings to the Senate Judiciary 
Commission of November 2018, it was suggested to 
amend Art. 378 - Appointment of control bodies - 
Paragraph 1 - modifying Art. 2477 of the Italian Civil 
Code, the third and fourth paragraphs as follows: 
“The appointment of the control body and of the 
external auditor is mandatory if the company: ... 
(omitted).” It has been argued that the mere 
modification of the conjunction "or" in the 
conjunction "and" (both in the first and last section 
of the first paragraph of amended Article 2477 of 
the Italian Civil Code) would greatly strengthen the 
control mechanism on limited liability companies, 
which is instrumental to crisis prevention. 
Further reflection is important. Contrary to 
what was sometimes suggested, the desired further 
legislative action would not have led to an increase 
in costs for small and medium-sized enterprises. It 
would not have been necessary in fact to appoint 
two separate parties as current law already states 
that the Board of Statutory Auditor can also perform 
the functions of the External Auditors. On the 
contrary, current law does not state the opposite, 
i.e., it does not state that External Auditors may 
carry out the supervisory activities: in the latter 
case, in fact, the status of “Board of Statutory 
Auditor” needs to be attributed necessarily to them. 
Hence having the “Board of Statutory Auditors” 
which in small entities can be monocratic with a 
sitting alone Statutory Auditor, only one person 
could be appointed but all the necessary powers for 
the pursuit of the alert's purpose would have been 
acknowledged. In summary, by incorporating the 
suggested amendment, a single controller would be 
introduced into corporate governance, as evidenced 
by the legislator in the case of SMEs, but the latter 
would have been equipped with both accounting 
management and essential supervisory powers, so 
on the one side, in small companies the appropriate 
arrangements were introduced and on the other side 
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the latter were more ready to face the introduction 
of alert mechanisms into the legal system.  
We cannot fail to notice that, if the non-
amendment of the law were linked - as it is - to the 
need for cost containment in small and medium-
sized companies, the rule implies that by appointing 
the External Auditor the latter shall, or rather, must 
take on new responsibilities in terms of providing 
alerts services for free. However, this seems hard to 
apply and therefore the appointment of only the 
External Auditor - instead of sitting alone Statutory 
Auditor - shall not in fact lead to cost savings for 
companies. The strength of the above motivation, if 
it were - as it seems - at the basis of legislator's 
choice, seems therefore rather diluted. 
In short, the Code in its definitive formulation 
merely does nothing other than request the External 
Auditors inappropriately, as it does not acknowledge 
the necessary powers, to perform tasks that do not 
fall within its remits. A de facto mutation of the very 
nature of the External Auditor's role is claimed by 
law as paradoxically the latter is requested to "be a 
sitting alone Statutory Auditor". 
In light of the reflections, it seems more than 
appropriate, regardless of the social form, to return 
to impose the presence of the Board of Statutory 
Auditors or at least the sitting alone Statutory 
Auditor delegating to the latter also the audit or 
providing that the latter work alongside the External 
Auditor. This is especially desirable in the larger 
companies with a board of directors - such as those 
that exceed the scope of Art. 2435-bis of the Italian 
Civil Code - even if organised in the form of a 
limited liability company (SRL) and not of public 
limited company (SPA). The above provision has 
been confirmed in the first comments to the 
wording of the new code. 
 
7. THE INDIRECT "INTRODUCTION BY LAW" IN 
SMES OF ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE, 
ORGANISATIONAL AND ACCOUNTING STRUCTURES 
 
In the Italian context, it is often noted that in small 
family companies administrative functions are still 
perceived as an unavoidable but "useless" cost as an 
obligation linked to the need to comply with mainly 
fiscal obligations. Often activities are delegated in 
total outsourcing without taking advantage of the 
opportunity to request in addition to mandatory 
obligations also useful tools for guiding the 
management and administration. The potential 
scope of the accounting tool and the relevance of the 
implementation of management control systems are 
not included. This way, the drafting of even basic 
instruments such as the simple company periodic 
reports or business units reports and, consequently, 
the identification and computation of significant KPI 
necessary for a good governance are far from being 
widespread. Planning and activities of drawing up 
economic, financial and asset budgets are almost 
absent. Besides in the rare cases in which they are 
implemented, they are often managed in a non-
professional way in the absence of any explanation 
of the assumptions or without strict consistency 
among the statements drawn up.  
It is worth pointing out that in these situations 
management control systems mentioned here, when 
present, are considered to be enough for all 
purposes. This means that they are often confused 
with the different structures linked to control and 
supervision activities. This means that they are 
mistaken for the Internal Control System (ICS). The 
latter, as known, responds to various needs and 
refers to different models and objectives, consisting 
of the processes implemented by the board of 
directors, executives and other parties of the 
company structure:  
 to provide a reasonable assurance in terms of 
reliability of the information contained in financial 
statements;  
 to achieve compliance objectives of 
organisational behaviour or compliance with the 
laws and regulations in force;  
 and finally to achieve a greater awareness of 
business risks and to allow continuity in achieving 
the objectives of effectiveness and efficiency of 
operating activities.  
The Internal Control System, as it should be 
mentioned in this context, is in fact represented by 
the lines of action and procedures - or internal 
controls - adopted by the management in order to 
allow for the achievement of corporate goals and to 
ensure an efficient and orderly conduct of corporate 
activities. However, the management of the company 
risk profile presupposes the knowledge and 
therefore the careful study of the nature of the 
various types of risks that threaten the continuity of 
the company's activity, as well as the probability of 
the emergence of these risks and their expected 
impact so as to provide for strategies for managing 
the various types of risks. Recent decades have 
made it possible the development and dissemination 
in the international field of theoretical models 
related to the Internal Control System that provide 
for conceptual references to the components of the 
latter in an manner which is easy to understand and 
share, as well as definitions of general applicability 
that ignore sectorial and geographical boundaries. 
Particularly worth mentioning here are the COSO 
Report and Enterprise Risk Management frameworks 
developed by the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations. The COSO Report, which is the 
results of the study carried out by the Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO) in 1992 and which was revised 
in 2013, represents a reference model aimed at 
improving internal control systems and providing 
the various components of the corporate structure 
with a common concept of control. The Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM) Framework instead - 
published in 2004 by the same Committee of 
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway 
Commission (COSO)3, represents a reference model 
that companies can adopt for managing business 
risks aimed at analysing the factors of risk, the 
assessment of their impact on company 
performance as well as the creation of value and 
competitive advantage. In other words, the ERM 
allows the management to deal more effectively with 
the uncertainties and consequent 
risks/opportunities, increasing the company's ability 
to generate value (or at least not to disperse it) 
achieving a balance between growth and profitability 
goals and the consequent risks. Business risk 
management is a process carried out by the Board of 
Directors, executives and other operators of the 
                                                          
3Please see https://www.coso.org/Documents/COSO-ERM-Executive-
Summary-Italian. 
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company structure, used for creating strategies 
throughout the company, designed to identify 
potential events that may affect the company's 
activities. The company must establish its own 
"acceptable risk" by identifying significant risk 
indicators (KPIs) and thus setting limits that allow 
for a reasonable assurance in terms of the 
achievement of company goals. The ERM is therefore 
a continuous process that involves the entire 
company and takes the form of a sequence of 
activities that must be pervasive and integrated 
within the existing management system, in order to 
avoid the addition of parallel procedures that would 
entail further costs and it is carried out by people 
who occupy positions at all levels of the company 
organisational structure that influence the 
effectiveness of the process and which in turn are 
conditioned by it. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITS AND FUTURE 
RESEARCHES 
 
In this paper, we have investigated how the 
corporate governance of Italian Family SMEs is 
expected to change in the near future.  
 We have pointed out that the new IC-Code can 
be considered to implement in a special Italian way 
some of the main suggestions coming from the 
family business framework (among the others 
already cited supra: Whisler, 1988; Goodstein, 
Gautam, & Boeker, 1994; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Colarossi et al., 2008; 
Di Toma, 2012). What is being implemented in the 
Italian context confirm that an appropriate 
governance practices may contribute to strategic 
renewal and value creation in family business 
especially when moving from state of crisis to a 
renewed growth and profitability stage. The 
involvement of independent professionals in the 
governance is considered so precious by the Italian 
legislator that they are heighten to the role of going 
concern and compliance guardians even in small 
sized family companies. Legal environment defines 
sets boundaries within which the companies operate 
and, as it often happens in Italy, changes are driven 
by the Legislator choices. Family SMEs are expected 
to shape in a few months their behaviours to fit the 
new requests, but this will take only to formal 
compliance. More time will be reasonably needed to 
have the novelty understood and internalized and 
finally to get the result to deeply change behaviours. 
 We have underlined a strong point of the IC-
Code which is the fact that the provision of control 
bodies implies the need to strengthen administrative 
organization. It enforces the enhancement - or the 
introduction ex novo, when necessary - of 
accounting, management and control processes and 
structures. On the one side articulated accounting 
and management systems will be essential to create 
dashboards of indicators deemed useful to manage 
and prevent crisis situations and therefore trigger 
alert procedures introduced by the Code. On the 
other side structured internal control systems will 
be needed to assure data robustness. Transparency 
is expected to improve as structural mix up between 
company and family affairs should start being faced 
and discussed. 
 We have anyway highlighted a weak point of 
the IC-Code which is the fact that the final text 
presents an important systemic inconsistencies that 
risk jeopardising the effectiveness of the use of 
indicators for crisis prevention allowing companies 
to choose which type of control to undergo. All 
companies, in fact, can decide whether to have a 
corporate control body - which is the Board of 
Statutory Auditors - or to limit themselves to 
appointing only the External Auditor who has no 
supervisory powers. The amendments required by 
relevant Institution - such as CNDCEC, APRI and 
Academia – weren‟t taken in consideration by the 
Italian Government. It will be than relevant to 
investigate which will be companies‟ future choices 
and the consequences on the alert process efficacy. 
 We have here chosen a review approach as the 
IC-Code has been approved and published the 14th 
February 2019, but it will be enforced only from 
August 2020. It is important to underline that Italy 
has shaped the new Law being inspired by the 
Proposal for a Directive on Restructuring COM 
(2016) 723, before its final approval. The 
consequence is that the Italian Text can be 
considered a trial field itself. In particular we focus 
on the IC-Code provisions on Family SMEs 
governance which go far beyond the one asked by 
the Directive Proposal. Our work then aims to be a 
first and early discussion of the special Italian 
Legislation choices. In the near future other EU 
Countries may look at Italian experience to make 
their own decisions. 
We are convinced that the Italian legislator 
choice to include Family SMEs in such a process is 
unique in the international panorama and will create 
an interesting lab for future empirical research. It 
will be important in new projects to investigate and 
measure how the introduction of the new control 
bodies will affect Family SMEs governance. It will be 
relevant to try to understand if the new rules will be 
considered and faced only as formal matter or if and 
how behaviours will be influenced and improved 
routines will put down roots. These new researches 
will need to collect series of data in more than the 
first application year, which is expected to be 2020 
as the upgrades required are so demanding that we 
can expect that it will take some times for operators 
to understand the IC-Code mechanisms and their 
implications. It will be also interesting to compare 
the national results at an EU level when the Directive 
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